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COVERED BONDS:  SHELTER FROM FINANCIAL 
TURMOIL, EXPOSURE TO THE 1940 ACT 
Steve Flantsbaum∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The current credit crisis, a consequence of business and consumer 
deleveraging, has raised financial stability concerns for many major 
national and regional banks.1  Falling home prices, soaring mortgage 
defaults and an exorbitant rise in the LIBOR2 – the lending rate banks 
use as a benchmark to loan money – have recently made it impossible 
for many homeowners to refinance their mortgages to affordable levels.3  
Though the Federal Reserve took drastic action to lower the lending and 
mortgage rates,4 many homeowners whose mortgage obligations ex-
ceeded the value of their homes simply chose to not pay their mortgages, 
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Lubin School of Business, Pace University, 2006.  I would like to dedicate my first 
legal publication to my father, Ilya Flantsbaum, who has been the most positive and in-
spirational influence in my life and whose memory will always be with me, my mother, 
Elina Dyakovetsky, whose love, support and perseverance through life’s hardships have 
been the greatest motivation in my own life, and Anna Drynda for her unfailing pa-
tience and optimism.  I would also like to thank Professor Harold Moore for his super-
vision and guidance and the members of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial 
Law for their editorial assistance and diligent help throughout the writing process. 
 1. Renzo G. Avesani et al., The Use of Mortgage Covered Bonds 3 (IMF Working 
Paper No. 07/20, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=961094. 
 2. LIBOR stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate. http://www.investopedia 
.com/terms/l/libor.asp. 
 3. See Deborah Levine, BOND REPORT: Covered Bonds Offer Hope for 
Sustainable Housing Market, MARKETWATCH, Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.marketwatch. 
com/news/story/covered-bonds-offer-hope-sustainable/story.aspx?guid=%7B98C3F5C3 
%2DAA18%2D4971%2DB30E%2D3F059EC644E7%7D&dist=msr_12. 
 4. Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Cuts Rates Near Zero to Battle Slump, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
17, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122945283457211111. 
html. 
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to default, and to walk away.5  This caused great uncertainty as to the 
value of assets the banks have bundled up, securitized and sold to in-
vestors.  As a result, banks that decided to keep some of these assets, as 
well as investors who hold many of those securitized loans in their 
portfolios, suffered steep write-downs because of depressed asset market 
prices.6  Such events effectively demolished the market for securitized 
mortgage bonds, and many financial institutions that had once participa-
ted in that market have exited with no indication of recommitting them-
selves to issuing those types of securities in the near term.7  Moreover, 
the increase in the interbank lending rate led the inversely correlated 
prices of banks’ bonds to plummet.8  This triggered the need to 
recapitalize banks, which began hoarding cash and minimizing 
consumer lending as they realized that their very survival was at stake 
due to insufficient capitalization.9  Analogous to a negative feedback 
loop, the banks’ hoarding of cash led to further increases in overnight 
lending rates, further decreases in asset prices, and further drops in 
securitize
The United States Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”), un-
der the guidance of then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson,11 realized 
that to recapitalize, financial institutions needed to provide avenues 
beyond the currently dysfunctional securitization market12 to encourage 
 5. See Eric Weiner, Why Not Just Walk Away from a Home, NPR, Feb. 9, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18958049. 
 6. Dan Levy, U.S. Foreclosures Jump 57% as Homeowners Walk Away, 
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087& 
refer=home&sid=ahJfJhKyxAWI.  This phenomenon has also been exacerbated by 
“mark-to-market” accounting, which mandates that assets be marked down to the price 
for which there exists market consensus.  When there are vastly more sellers than buy-
ers, however, the markdowns can be enormous, sometimes not reflecting the assets’ 
eventual recovery value. 
 7. See Levine, supra note 3. 
 8. Posting of Felix Salmon to Market Movers Blog on Portfolio.com, http://www. 
portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/07/08/what-is-a-covered-bond (July 8, 
2008, 17:08 EDT) [hereinafter Salmon Posting]. 
 9. Mish’s Global Economic Trend Analysis, http://globaleconomicanalysis.blog 
spot.com/2008/11/banks-hoard-cash-credit-card-bond-sales.html (Nov. 5, 2008, 20:26 
PST). 
 10. Levine, supra note 3 (“Issuance of mortgage-backed debt this year through July 
has dropped 83% from last year.”). 
 11. Henry M. Paulson, Jr.–Biography, http://www.treas.gov/education/history/secre 
taries/hmpaulson.shtml (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). 
 12. In a securitization, the originating institution pools together its interest in 
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investors to buy loans from the banks’ books.  Investors’ purchases of 
these loans would increase asset prices and decrease mortgage rates, 
which would in turn incentivize new buyers to enter the devastated real 
estate market.13  The Treasury has therefore decided that we must look 
beyond the current structure of securitized lending that lets banks divest 
themselves of mortgage loans.  We should instead look into new issu-
ances that help lenders make long-term loans and hold those loans on 
their balance sheets.14  One possible way to lower borrowing costs and 
revive lending is to issue debt secured by collateral kept on the banks’ 
books.15  This is the essential feature of a covered bond, an established 
financial instrument in Europe.  The Treasury specifically recommended 
the establishment of a covered bond market in the U.S. with the goal of 
developing it as an alternative method for banks to issue and sell mort-
gage loans to investors.16 
While creation of a covered bond market may alleviate stress from 
dysfunctional securitization markets, issuance of covered bonds must be 
complementary to business goals of investors and issuers alike.  From 
the investors’ standpoint, covered bonds offer recourse to the issuers’ 
assets, thus giving investors security in the event of default.17  From the 
issuers’ view, covered bonds attract investors – and their capital – due to 
characteristics such as offering a higher credit rating and recourse to the 
issuer’s assets.18  Issuers, however, would be more reluctant to offer 
covered bonds if they had to comply with an additional substantial 
burden of compliance, such as that of the Investment Company Act of 
financial assets with identifiable future cash flows, and sells those claims to a Special 
Purpose Entity (“SPE”) whose only role is to hold those assets.  Investors then purchase 
these assets from the Special Purpose Entity.  Therefore, the originating institution 
obtains ready capital in exchange for those assets’ future cash flows.  See Frank J. 
Fabozzi & Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation (Yale 
Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 07-07, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997079. 
 13. See Levine, supra note 3. 
 14. See Bert Ely, Op-Ed., We Need Fundamental Mortgage Reform, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 8, 2008, at A19. 
 15. Salmon Posting, supra note 8. 
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BEST PRACTICES FOR RESIDENTIAL COVERED 
BONDS 6 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/USCovered 
BondBestPractices.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE]. 
 17. See infra Parts II-III. 
 18. See infra Parts II-III. 
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1940 (the “1940 Act”)19, without another avenue that would avoid such 
reporting complications. 
Part I of this Note describes the European covered bond market and 
identifies some regulatory frameworks that allowed the covered bond to 
develop there into a promising financial instrument.  Part II of this Note 
briefly explains recent efforts by the Treasury and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) to cultivate a covered bond market 
in the United States, focusing on the treatment of covered bond investors 
in case of issuer’s default.  Finally, Part III uncovers a potential obstacle 
for covered bond issuers:  the loss of a specific 1940 Act exemption 
from “investment company” status for public offerings of structured fi-
nancings, Rule 3a-7.20  Part III then identifies an alternative way issuers 
could achieve this exempted status and makes a brief recommendation 
regarding the future benefit of expanding Rule 3a-7 for the sake of de-
veloping the covered bond market. 
I.  THE EUROPEAN COVERED BOND MARKET 
A.  History and Description of the European Covered Bond Market 
During the last decade, the European mortgage market has expand-
ed at an annual rate of more than 8%.21  In order to turn mortgage loans 
into available capital, European financial institutions employed covered 
bonds,22 as opposed to issuing securitized debt.23  Several European 
laws adopted specifically for covered bond issuances tremendously 
helped lift that market.  As a result an estimated €2.11 trillion worth of 
covered bonds was outstanding as of the end of 2007.24 
 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1940). 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1992). 
 21. Bond Basics:  Covered Bonds (PIMCO, New York, N.Y.), DEC. 2006, at 4 
[hereinafter Bond Basics], available at http://media.pimco-global.com/pdfs/pdf_uk/ 
Europe--Covered%20bond%20basics.pdf?WT.cg_n=PIMCO-EUROPE&WT.ti= 
Europe--Covered%20bond%20basics.pdf. 
 22. “Covered bonds are debt instruments secured by a cover pool of mortgage 
loans (property as collateral) . . . to which investors have a preferential claim in the 
event of default.”  European Covered Bond Council, About Covered Bonds, http://ecbc. 
hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=311 (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). 
 23. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 9 (stating that the covered 
bond market dates back to over 200 years, to the initial Prussian issuance in 1770). 
 24. Id. 
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The performance of covered bonds has been more resilient during 
the credit crisis than either Asset Backed Securities (“ABS”) or Mort-
gage Backed Securities (“MBS”).25  Admittedly, spreads on covered 
bonds have widened sharply and declining market values of their hold-
ings have harmed covered bond holders.26  Indeed, sales of covered 
bonds declined over five straight months27 and global covered bond 
issuance for the year through September 2008 fell 10% from the same 
period in 2007.28  That is almost insignificant, however, compared to the 
same-stretch issuance of European mortgage-backed securities 
(“MBS”), which plunged an enormous 96% in 2008 through September, 
compared with the same period in 2007.29  As for the erosion of market 
value, although covered bonds suffered a 1.12% loss in September 
2008,30 they still outperformed investment-grade company debt, which 
tumbled 3.9%.31 
The mechanics of a covered bond transaction bear great similarities 
to secured financings.  Essentially, covered bonds are debt instruments 
secured against a pool of assets.32  European credit institutions issuing 
covered bonds use mainly long-term funding collateral, such as residen-
tial or commercial property, public sector claims and ship mortgage 
loans, to support their long-term lending activities.33  The issuing institu-
tion pledges a specific pool of collateral (the “cover pool”) to an investor 
in return for capital, while the covered bond investor obtains the interest 
on covered bonds, which is paid out from the issuer’s general business 
 25. Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Speech at the 2008 
Eurofi Conference (Sept. 11, 2008). 
 26. See Jane Baird & Natalie Harrison, Once-Stable Covered Bond Market Dries 
Up for Banks, REUTERS, Oct 1, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/FS 
CONS/idUSL116536320081001. 
 27. See Shelley Smith, Covered Bonds Head for Their Worst Month Since 1999, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=aV8SbAi9hkA8. 
 28. Mark Brown, Crisis on Wall Street: Letter from the City/News and Insights 
from London’s Financial Center, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2008, at C2. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Smith, supra note 27. 
 31. Id.  N.B.  This discussion relies on figures current through September 2008.  In 
the late fall and winter of 2008 and continuing through the time of publication, a 
marked deterioration of the economy occurred that caused significant erosion of market 
value in all types of investments. 
 32. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 4. 
 33. Ralf Grossmann & Otmar Stöcker, Generic Section, in EUROPEAN COVERED 
BOND FACTBOOK 67 (2d ed. 2007). 
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cash flows.34  The issuing banks must keep the cover pool on their 
balance sheets and the covered bond investors retain a preferred claim 
against the assets in the cover pool in the event of an issuer default.35  
Therefore, the issuing institution is still responsible for losses caused by 
borrowers’ defaults or delinquencies.  In the event the issuing institution 
fails to make payments on a covered bond, the covered bond holders are 
entitled to recourse to the cover pool and, if that proves insufficient, to 
the issuer’s other assets.36  By contrast, an investor in a typical securiti-
zation only has recourse against the Special Purpose Entity (the “SPE,” 
also sometimes called a Special Purpose Vehicle, or “SPV”) that issued 
securitized loans, whose balance sheet typically consists strictly of those 
loans.37  Because of true sale,38 the investor in a securitization does not 
have recourse to the originating bank’s assets and so does not have a 
claim against the bank if the SPE’s loan pool is insufficient to satisfy his 
claim. 
Covered bonds benefit investors by carrying a higher yield than 
European government bonds without significantly increasing the risk 
and credit quality of their portfolios.39  Most covered bonds carry ratings 
of double- or triple-A, ranking them extremely safe among corporate 
debt securities.40  To rate covered bonds so highly, all major rating agen-
cies focus on the structure of the cover pool, including its ability to re-
tain value in the event of issuer default and the quality of the mort-
 34. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7. 
 35. See id. at 11. 
 36. See id. at 7; see also Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 3. 
 37. For this and other characteristics of SPEs, see, e.g., Gary Gorton and Nicholas 
S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, FRB Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://knowledge.wharton 
.upenn.edu/papers/1314.pdf.  Without any pledged collateral behind securitized bonds, 
investors have no recourse to the issuer’s assets.  The SPE, which does not have any 
assets aside from the assets backing the receivables themselves, also does not offer any 
extra recourse.  The investors are therefore left holding receivables that are not paying 
in accordance to the original structure. 
 38. “True sale” is a legally recognized transfer of receivables from the originator to 
the SPE, whereby these receivables become the legal property of the SPE and are not 
affected by the originator’s bankruptcy or claims by the originator’s unsecured cre-
ditors.  See Fabozzi & Kothari, supra note 12. 
 39. See Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 2, 5. 
 40. See id.; see also Frank Packer et al., The Covered Bond Market, BIS Q. REV., 
Sept. 2007, at 49-51, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0709f.pdf (discus-
sing differences of opinion in credit ratings among credit rating agencies and for 
European country-by-country data on covered bond ratings). 
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gages.41  The rating agencies are cautious, however, because even if the 
cover assets retain their value, creditors of the defaulted issuer who are 
not investors in its covered bonds could try to seize the assets in the cov-
er pool to satisfy their claims.42  To maintain the product’s credit excel-
lence, European covered bond legislation addresses this problem by spe-
cifying that assets within the cover pool must be high quality, the cover 
pool must be segregated for the benefit of covered bond holders, and in-
vestment in covered bonds must come with full recourse against the 
cover pool and the issuer.43 
B.  The European Covered Bond Regulatory Framework 
Most European countries use similar special-law based frame-
works44 that govern issuances of covered bonds.45  The frameworks pro-
vide guidance as to what types of assets are eligible for inclusion in the 
cover pool, asset/liability management, credit enhancements and over-
collateralization requirements.46  The existence of those frameworks is 
directly responsible for a liquid secondary market for covered bonds, 
which makes the financial instrument even more attractive to 
investors.47  Although a special-law based framework increases market 
homogeneity and simplicity,48 some countries in Europe still prefer to 
 
 41. See, e.g., Packer et al., supra note 40, at 47; Covered Bonds, FITCH RATINGS 
(Fitch Ratings, New York, N.Y.), http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/sectors/ 
covered_bonds/coveredbonds_factsheet.pdf (stating “[i]n order to maintain its covered 
bonds ratings, Fitch Ratings receives at least quarterly reporting from issuers about their 
cover pool and covered bonds, and carries out operational visits.”); see Bond Basics, 
supra note 21. 
 42. See Packer et al., supra note 40, at 47. 
 43. See Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 2. 
 44. “A special-law based framework is a legal framework based on a law and/or 
binding regulations of a public supervisory authority, specifically dedicated to regulate 
a covered bond system of a country.”  European Covered Bond Council, ECBC 
Essential Features of Covered Bonds [hereinafter Essential Features of Covered Bonds], 
http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=367 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 45. Id. (“As of December 2007, special-law based frameworks exist in 26 countries 
in Europe.”). 
 46. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 4-5. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 9 (“Typically, a 
legislative framework exists in nations with a long history of Covered Bonds while 
nations with a relatively young Covered Bond market . . . have a structured frame-
work.”). 
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 covered bonds’ 
success. 
1.  The Jumbo Covered Bonds Model 
 covered bond issuance structure to suit 
forei n
 
(2) onds (fixed, not variable cou-
ars); 
(4) bonds must be officially listed on an organized market; 
(5) id/ask prices si-
multaneously to maintain a liquid market.52 
2.  The UCITS Directive 
Directive”) has proved especially conducive to the covered bond mar-
 
operate under a general-law based framework that replicates special-law 
based covered bond issuances through general contract laws and 
regulations of those countries.49  What follow are certain European 
frameworks, directives and regulations that facilitated
The “jumbo” or “benchmark” model, first introduced in Germany 
in 1995, has been the initial driver for covered bonds’ success.50  Its in-
fluence has now expanded into other European countries.  The jumbo 
model added several features to a regular covered bonds issuance to in-
crease liquidity and improve the
g  institutional investors:51 
(1) The minimum issuance size is €1,000,000; 
Jumbos must be plain vanilla b
pon, paid annually in arre
(3) Buybacks are permitted; 
The 
and 
At least three market makers must quote b
After the launch of jumbo covered bonds, the covered bond market 
continued to expand through the 1999 introduction of Euro-denominated 
securities and the 2001 introduction of Europe’s common currency.53  
More recently, Article 22(4) of the European Directive on Undertakings 
for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities54 (the “UCITS 
 49. See Essential Features of Covered Bonds, supra note 44.  There is a movement 
by those countries, however, to standardize their legal frameworks relating to covered 
bonds to the tune of Europe’s majority.  See, e.g., Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 4 n.5. 
 50. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 5; Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 4. 
 51. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 5; Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 4. 
 52. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
 53. Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 4-5. 
 54. Council Directive 2001/108, 2002 O.J. (L 41) 35 (EC); see Bond Basics, supra 
note 21, at 2. 
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ket’s continued growth.55  This directive solidifies the privileged status 
of covered bonds as compared to MBS or unsecured bank debt. 
Article 22(4) significantly lifts investment caps by allowing invest-
ment funds and insurance companies to invest up to 25% and 40% of 
their assets, respectively, as opposed to the usual 5% limit, in the cov-
ered bonds of a single issuer as long as the issuer and the bonds satisfy 
the following eligibility criteria:56 
 
(1) The covered bonds must be issued by an EU credit institu-
tion.  According to the European Covered Bond Council (the 
“ECBC”), “[a] credit institution is an entity licensed to carry 
on one or more banking activities, such as receiving deposits 
from the public, granting loans or providing payment serv-
ices” and is subject “to public supervision and regulation 
which prescribes standards for the management of credit, 
liquidity, interest rate and operational risks.” 
 
(2) The covered bonds must be subject to special supervision by 
the public authorities with the specific aim of protecting the 
covered bond holders.  The ECBC identifies the standard 
features of special supervision to include: a special cover 
pool monitor, periodic audits of the cover pool by the cover 
pool monitor and ongoing management, and maintenance of 
the cover pool upon the credit institution’s insolvency to 
ensure timely payment to covered bond holders.57  The 
public authorities, which may include rating agencies, must 
regularly supervise banking or capital markets activities.  
These authorities should regularly monitor the underlying 
cover assets and distribute that information to investors.58 
 
(3) The sums deriving from the issuance of covered bonds must 
be placed in assets which provide sufficient cover for the 
liabilities deriving from the bonds until maturity.  The ECBC 
suggests that the value of the cover assets must be at least 
equal to the value of the covered bonds.59  Most jurisdic-
 55. See Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 1-2. 
 56. Council Directive 2001/108, art. 22(4)-(5) 2002 O.J. (L 41) 35 (EC); see Bond 
Basics, supra note 21, at 2. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. 
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tions, however, either through a special-law framework, con-
tract law or some combination of the two, also require over-
collateralization, so that the value of the cover pool must 
exceed the value of the covered bonds by a prescribed 
amount.60  The issuing credit institution may be required to 
provide additional assets for cover if all or a portion of the 
original assets mature, default or otherwise fail to meet 
specified eligibility criteria, thus making the cover pool 
“dynamic.”61  Hence, there is no outright connection bet-
ween a specific cover pool or individual loans and out-
standing covered bonds since the cover pool’s composition 
is subject to change.62  If the cover pool is insufficient and 
the issuer cannot substitute or add assets or buy back the 
covered bonds, the pool accelerates and the debt obligation 
pays out prior to its due date.63 
 
(4) The bonds under consideration must be guaranteed by the 
issuer and should grant preferential rights to the bondholder 
in the event of the issuer’s default.  The cover assets must be 
clearly identified, segregated and placed as security for the 
bonds.64  In bankruptcy proceedings, covered bond holders 
have recourse against that pool of assets against which the 
covered bond pool has been secured.  If the pool of assets is 
insufficient to cover the default as a result of non-payments 
on underlying mortgage or lease payments, the investors also 
have recourse against the issuer itself.65  General, unsecured 
creditors have no claim against the cover assets.66 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id.; Alain Marcel & Bernd Volk, Covered Bonds: Influence of 
Securitisation Techniques, in EUROPEAN COVERED BOND FACTBOOK 61 (2d ed. 2007). 
 62. See Marcel & Volk, supra note 62, at 61. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Vinod Kothari, The Name Is Bond. Covered Bond. (Sept. 5, 2008 rev.), 
http://www.vinodkothari.com/covered%20bonds%20article%20by%20vinod%20kothar
i.pdf.  However, such a lapse has not happened since the modern form of covered bonds 
was adopted in 1899.  American Securitization Forum Statement on U.S. Covered 
Bonds, AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.american 
securitization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Covered%20Bond%20Statement_ 
072808.pdf. 
 66. Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 3. 
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3.  The Capital Requirement Directive 
The Capital Requirement Directive (the “CRD”) originated in a 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposal and was adopted on 
June 7, 2006 to amend the supervisory regulations that direct the capital 
adequacy of international banks.67  The CRD significantly lowers risk 
weighting for certain covered bond holders, enabling them to hold less 
capital in reserve against the bonds.68  It allows credit institutions 
investing in covered bonds to assign a 10% risk weighting – down from 
20% – to covered bonds complying with these criteria.69  Credit institu-
tions can take advantage of the CRD benefits if the bonds: 
 
(1) Meet the UCITS Directive criteria, and 
(
 
2) Are backed by high-quality asset classes.70 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF COVERED BONDS IN THE UNITED STATES –  
THE FDIC FINAL COVERED BOND POLICY STATEMENT AND THE 
TREASURY BEST PRACTICES FOR RESIDENTIAL COVERED BONDS GUIDE 
Although securitization has been the preferred method of pooling 
and repackaging cash-flow producing financial assets for sale to invest-
tors, originations of ABS, MBS, and covered bonds slowed to a trickle 
during the credit crisis.71  Some are optimistic, however, that a covered 
bond framework may appeal to U.S. investors and help financial insti-
tutions recapitalize themselves through new debt issuances.72  Federal 
 67. See Council Directive 2006/48, 2006 O.J. (L177) 1 (EC); Council Directive 
2006/49, 2006 O.J. (L177) 201 (EC). 
 68. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 6; Bond Basics, supra note 21. 
 69. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 6. 
 70. High-quality asset classes include commercial and residential mortgages, pub-
lic sector loans, ship loans, and Senior MBS.  See Bond Basics, supra note 21.  
However, market participants in countries that do not have specific covered bond legis-
lation, but instead use the general-law framework, such the U.K., expand the definition 
to include bonds issued under private contractual arrangements using elements from 
structured finance.  See Packer et al., supra note 40, at 52. 
 71. See John Brinsley & Robert Schmidt, Paulson Shifts Focus of Rescue to 
Consumer Lending, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=aoD4QebIb_Fo&refer=home. 
 72. Kevin Warsh, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks on Covered Bond 
Framework at the U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Conference on Covered Bond 
Framework (July 28, 2008) [hereinafter Warsh Remarks], available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20080728a.htm. 
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Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh73 stated that covered bonds are of such 
high rating and high quality that they would generally fall within the 
range of eligible collateral that the Federal Reserve has long accepted 
from depository institutions at its discount window.74  Therefore, 
“[p]rivate lenders also are likely to find such bonds attractive as colla-
teral for credit extensions” in the United States.75 
To date, only two U.S. institutions have issued covered bonds:  
euro-denominated sale by Washington Mutual in 2006, followed by 
Bank of America’s euro-denominated and dollar-denominated sales in 
2007.76  Without a special-law framework, these issuances were done 
through contractual dealings.77  In view of the credit crisis, however, the 
Treasury has taken a special interest in developing a specific covered 
bond framework in the United States.  The Treasury believes that such a 
market will create a viable alternative to securitization while the latter 
market is struggling, and will later serve as a complement to securitiza-
tion when the market picks up.78  The Treasury’s proposal has already 
attracted interest and enlisted support from the country’s largest banks – 
Treasury’s discussions with market participants suggest that a covered bond 
framework may attract investor interest and facilitate greater access to mortgage 
credit.  High-quality assets might be financed if banks are allowed to manage pools of 
loans, substituting new loans into the pool as others become delinquent.  Newly issued 
covered bonds backed by high quality mortgage loans and issued by strong financial 
institutions may find a growing investor base in the United States. 
Id. 
 73. Kevin M. Warsh–Biography, http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/ 
board/warsh.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 74. Warsh Remarks, supra note 73. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Paul J. Davies, New Issues:  Bank of America in Covered Bond Deal, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar 28, 2007, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id= 
fto032820071551280140; News Release, Washington Mut., WaMu Settles Ground-
breaking European Covered Bond Sale (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://newsroom. 
wamu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=189529&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=909733&highlight. 
 77. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 9. 
 78. Id. at 5 (“Covered Bonds present an alternative source of funding for 
institutions that can complement other sources of financing for a wide range of high-
quality assets.”); id. at 3 (“Treasury believes that Covered Bonds represent a potential 
additional source of financing that could reduce borrowing costs for homeowners, 
improve liquidity in the residential mortgage market, and help depository institutions 
strengthen their balance sheets by diversifying their funding sources.”). 
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J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo.79  
Domestic brokerages like Goldman Sachs are also directing staff and 
resources to concentrate on underwriting, marketing and trading covered 
bonds.80 
On July 15, 2008, the FDIC released the Final Statement of Policy 
on the treatment of covered bonds (the “Policy Statement”).81  As a sup-
plement to the Policy Statement, the Treasury issued a Best Practices for 
Residential Covered Bonds guide (the “Best Practices Guide”).82  These 
documents inform potential investors of details regarding issuances of 
covered bonds and treatment of covered bond holders in an effort to pro-
mote growth of the covered bonds market in the United States.83  
Specifically, the Treasury identifies many elements necessary for a debt 
instrument to qualify as a covered bond.84 
As a guide for a fledgling market, the Treasury has adopted particu-
lar features of European covered bonds that helped the European market 
to grow.85  Most importantly, the depository institution that issues cov-
ered bonds must retain that cover pool on its balance sheet, unlike the 
MBS where mortgages are packaged, securitized and sold off to inves-
tors.  Covered bond holders must also have full recourse to the cover 
pool and the issuer’s assets.86  Taking another cue from the European 
special-law framework, the Treasury advises that the interest on covered 
bonds not be paid from mortgage income, as in the MBS structure, but 
rather from the issuer’s general cash flows.87 
Additionally, issuances of covered bonds are limited to 4% of the 
issuer’s liabilities, inclusive of the bonds, and set strict requirements 
regarding which type of collateral is eligible to be part of the cover 
assets.88  The collateral securing covered bonds must consist of, among 
 79. See Hillary Johnson, Why Covered Bonds May Fail, FIN. WEEK, Aug. 11, 2008, 
available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080811/REG/ 
456415429. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Covered Bond Policy Statement, Final 
Statement of Policy (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter FDIC Press Release], available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08060a.html. 
 82. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 6. 
 83. See id. at 3. 
 84. See id. at 7-8. 
 85. See id. at 6. 
 86. See id. at 7-8. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 15 (explaining that this is done so that the FDIC, the Treasury, and 
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other requirements:  performing first-lien mortgages, underwritten at the 
fully-indexed rate89 with documented income and a maximum Loan-to-
Value ratio (“LTV”) of 80%90 and one-to-four family residential pro-
perties, in which the covered bond holders must have a perfected securi-
ty interest.91  The mortgages must also be current on the date of inclu-
sion in the cover pool, and the issuer must replace any mortgages that 
become more than 60-days past due.92  This stands in contrast to the 
MBS structure in which the underlying mortgages remain in each MBS 
until maturity.  The Treasury granted some leniency, however, in accept-
ance of eligible collateral by providing that covered bonds may be se-
cured by a limited volume of AAA-rated mortgage securities and certain 
substitution collateral such as cash and Treasury and agency securities, 
on the condition that limited volume not exceed 10% of eligible colla-
teral.93  Moreover, the Treasury specifies that maturity for covered 
bonds must be between one year and thirty years, and that issuers must 
overcollateralize94 the cover assets in excess of the notional value of the 
other regulators could evaluate the development of the covered bond market). 
 89. See id. at 19 (“The fully indexed rate equals the index rate prevailing at origi-
nation plus the margin to be added to it after the expiration of an introductory interest 
rate.”). 
 90. The issuer must update the LTV based on the most recent valuation of the 
underlying assets.  See id. at 12; Kothari, supra note 66 (“If the LTV is found to be 
more than 80%, only 80% of the value of the property will be considered for counting 
the size of the pool.  In other words, the excess of the outstanding loan amount over 
80% of the value of the property will be ignored for the purpose of counting the pool 
value.”). 
 91. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 11-12. 
 92. See id. at 12. 
 93. See id. at 12-14. 
 94. Issuers of covered bonds can perhaps earn interest on excess spread within 
covered bond funding transactions to alleviate the burden of holding extra collateral.  
Excess spread is the difference between the weighted average interest rate of the under-
lying loans that a financial institution receives from mortgage borrowers and the 
weighted average funding cost of the transaction in the form of coupon payments to 
covered bond investors.  The funding cost of the transaction should be less than the 
weighted average rate of the underlying loans.  Fabozzi & Kothari, supra note 12.  
Because a covered bond transaction is a secured financing deal and covered bond pay-
ments are disbursed from an issuer’s cash flow instead of the underlying mortgage pay-
ments, a covered bond issuing SPE should structure interest payments earned on the ex-
cess spread to the issuing bank.  Although excess spread is commonly used to absorb 
expected losses from the asset pool, the issuing bank is nonetheless under an obligation 
to replace non-performing assets, diminishing the benefit of a SPE retaining the excess 
spread. 
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covered bonds by at least 5% of the outstanding principal balance at all 
times.95 
Moreover, the issuer must appoint an independent Asset Monitor, 
such as a rating agency or some other entity of that capability, to per-
form a monthly Asset Coverage Test to ensure collateral quality and the 
proper level of overcollateralization, to determine whether any cover 
pool asset substitutions are necessary and to report this documented in-
formation to investors.96  For disclosure, the Treasury recommends 
looking to Regulation AB97 for guidance on supplying investors with 
descriptive information on the asset pool.98 
The Best Practices Guide also specifies that a depository institution 
may issue covered bonds under one of two proposals:  it can issue cov-
ered bonds directly, including through its wholly-owned subsidiary 
(“direct-issuance structure”), or through a bankruptcy-remote SPE 
created for the purpose of issuing covered bonds (“SPE-issuance 
structure”).99  If the depository institution or its subsidiary directly 
issues covered bonds, the bank designates a dynamic mortgage pool of 
 95. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 11-12; Kothari, supra 
note 66 (“The asset cover or pool value . . . should at least be 105% of the outstanding 
bond liabilities at any time.”). 
 96. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 14.  In addition, aside 
from rating the quality of the cover assets, a covered bond transaction shines a spotlight 
on the credit quality of the financial institution.  If the cover pool is insufficient to make 
scheduled payments to covered bond holders, those holders have recourse to the issuer’s 
assets.  From the investors’ perspective, “as long as the bank is solvent, they are really 
looking to the bank to pay the obligation on the covered bonds.  They’re not looking to 
the cover pool.”  John Arnholz et al., Covered Bonds: Shelter from the Storm?, ASSET 
SECURITIZATION REP. ROUNDTABLE, May 26, 2008, at 12, 16-17 [hereinafter ASR 
REPORT], available at http://www.mckeenelson.com/files/Publication/aa07bcfc-2ef7-4c 
c2-a2e0-021fcdb1a4f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b96095b8-0468-4651-befc-
042b6c3eaeb2/11.pdf (statement of Roundtable participant Prue Larocca, Managing 
Dir., RBS Greenwich Capital).  Consequently, overuse of covered bond obligations 
could hurt issuer ratings, as the rating agencies could deem the issuers oversubscribed 
with obligations, which ultimately could hinder the issuing banks’ ability to obtain other 
debt funding and thus deter unsecured investors.  See Al Yoon, Covered Bonds Won’t 
Replace Securitization – BofA, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://uk.reuters. 
com/article/marketsNewsUS/idUKN0846274820080208; see also Yair Listokin, Is 
Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An 
Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1047-48 (1981) (discussing drawbacks of 
secured debt). 
 97. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1100-.1123 (2005). 
 98. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 14. 
 99. See id. at 11, 17-18. 
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e structure.104 
which involves creation of a bankruptcy-remote SPE and swap 
 
revolving mortgage loans on its balance sheet that secures the mortgage 
bonds and that ultimately backs the covered bonds.100  Under the SPE-
issuance structure, the SPE must purchase mortgage bonds from the 
depository institution, and must secure the mortgage bonds against a 
dynamic pool of residential mortgages.101  The SPE then issues covered 
bonds backed by assets in the cover pool to investors.102  In both 
structures, however, the covered bond holders have a first-priority claim 
on the cover assets.103  In addition, the cover pool will always remain on 
the balance sheets of depository institutions, regardless of the covered 
bond issuanc
In view of the dynamic nature of the cover pool, prepayment of 
loans does not affect investors because new assets will be substituted in-
to the cover pool.105  An important issue arises, however, regarding cov-
ered bond holders’ protection against prepayment risk in case of issuer 
default.  The SPE-issuance structure is primarily designed to protect 
covered bond holders against such prepayment risk if the originating 
depository institution defaults;106 it is also intended to enable the FDIC 
to access potential excess residual collateral over the limit necessary to 
protect covered bond holders.107  It is possible that the SPE-issuance 
structure, which was used in the previously mentioned Bank of America 
and Washington Mutual U.S. covered bond transactions,108 can benefit 
covered bond holders in case of issuer default by retaining elements of 
securitization while capitalizing on the advantages of a covered bond 
structure.109  This may be accomplished through asset segregation, 
 100. See id. at 11. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Kothari, supra note 66. 
 106. See Chris Ginieczki, The Issuer’s Perspective–USA, in EUROPEAN COVERED 
BOND FACTBOOK, 219, 219 (2d ed. 2007). 
 107. ASR REPORT, supra note 97, at 15 (statement of Roundtable participant 
Michael Krimminger, Special Advisor, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.). 
 108. Id. 
 109. True sale, however, while an important benefit of securitization, is lost in a 
covered bond transaction because the presence of a recourse obligation defeats the point 
of transferring the risks and rewards of the assets to investors.  A covered bond issuance 
clearly reflects a financing transaction between the depository institution and the SPE. 
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arrangements with a Specified Investment Contract Provider, as 
described below.110 
The depository institution makes the SPE bankruptcy-remote by 
restricting the SPE’s activities in as many ways as possible.  Primarily, 
this is done by appointing independent directors whose consent is re-
quired for the SPE to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, limiting the 
amount of debt an SPE can have, limiting the number of creditors and 
employees so they are not able to put the SPE into involuntary bank-
ruptcy, observing all appropriate arms-length third-party formalities with 
the originator, and adopting provisions in the articles of organization 
prohibiting asset sale, merger, consolidation, dissolution and liquida-
tion.111  The result is that the SPE-issuance structure creates a separate 
trust dealing exclusively with covered bond issuances.  Bankruptcy-
remoteness ensures that even if the issuing bank defaults, the SPE will 
continue functioning as intended. 
Despite the creation of a bankruptcy-remote SPE, investors may 
remain wary of the treatment of their covered bonds in case of default, 
with particular focus on acceleration of their covered bond investments.  
If an issuing depository institution defaults, the cover pool along with 
the issuer’s remaining balance sheet assets transfer under FDIC control.  
The FDIC may then enter into a conservatorship112 or a receivership113 
role and will try to transfer the defaulted issuer’s operations to a buyer 
that will assume its obligations.  In those roles, the FDIC has three 
options regarding covered bond transactions of that depository institu-
tion:114 
 
(1) Continue to perform on the depository institution’s covered 
bond contracts; 
 110. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 13. 
 111. Gorton & Souleles, supra note 37. 
 112. A form of bankruptcy whereby the FDIC steps in to take care of financial and 
legal matters of the defaulting institution.  See Fed. Deposit Ins. Act § 11(c)-(d), 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(c)-(d) (2008) (describing the appointment, functions, and powers of an 
FDIC conservatorship). 
 113. A court order whereby all the property subject to dispute in a legal action is 
placed under the care of a disinterested party, in this case the FDIC, whose goal is to 
preserve the defaulting institution’s property from adverse claims.  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1296-97 (8th ed. 2004); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)-(d) (describing the 
appointment, functions, and powers of an FDIC receivership). 
 114. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 16. 
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(2) Use cash to pay off the covered bonds up to the value of the 
pledged collateral; or 
(3) Permit liquidation of the pledged collateral to pay off the 
covered bonds.115 
 
Even if the issuing institution enters insolvency proceedings, it is 
far from certain that covered bond obligations will be accelerated be-
cause the FDIC may choose the first option.  If the FDIC selects either 
of the latter two options, covered bond holders may be at some risk of 
non-payment from the FDIC’s exercise of an automatic stay over the 
defaulting institution’s assets.116  The covered bond holder, however, ob-
tains direct access to the cover pool ten days after the FDIC’s appoint-
ment as conservator or receiver through the FDIC’s automatic consent if 
the depository institution taken over by the FDIC remains in monetary 
default and the covered bond holder provides written request to exercise 
his contractual remedies.117 
In the event that the FDIC does not wish to continue performance 
on the defaulted issuer’s covered bond obligations and repudiates the 
covered bond contract, the Treasury, as a precaution, advises that the 
SPE must enter into a Specified Investment Contract through a swap 
arrangement, in which “[f]ollowing a payment default by the issuer or 
repudiation by the FDIC as conservator or receiver, the Specified Invest-
ment should pay ongoing scheduled interest and principal payments so 
long as the Specified Investment Provider receives proceeds of the 
Cover Pool assets at least equal to the par value of the Covered 
Bonds.”118  Therefore, even if the depository institution defaults, the 
Specified Investment Contract continues the arrangement between the 
issuer and the covered bond holders; the covered bond holders receive 
scheduled payments from the proceeds of the Cover Pool instead of the 
institution’s cash flows.  Nevertheless, it is still possible that the liquida-
tion proceeds of the covered bonds may be insufficient to reimburse the 
covered bond holders or the Specified Investment Provider.  This prob-
lem can be cured, however, through another swap agreement with a third 
 115. Id. 
 116. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). 
 117. Such remedies may include liquidation of the pledged collateral.  TREASURY 
BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 32-33; see FDIC Press Release, supra note 
82.  In contrast, European law only provides two options in case of issuer’s insolvency: 
government bailout or liquidation.  See ASR REPORT, supra note 97, at 13 (statement of 
Roundtable participant Michael Krimminger, Special Advisor, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.). 
 118. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 13. 
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party.  The third party, who could be the Specified Investment Provider 
or another market participant, will agree to compensate the covered 
bond holders for the deficiency in exchange for a certain sum, which 
could be part of the overcollateralization percentage.  In any event, if the 
covered bonds repay investors less than the principal and accrued 
interest owed, investors can preserve an unsecured claim on the issuer’s 
other assets ranking pari passu, or equal, with other unsecured inves-
tors.119  In essence, the cover pool achieves securitization’s goal of 
avoiding substantive consolidation during bankruptcy, since the cover 
pool assets may not be combined with assets destined for unsecured 
creditors in the event of default. 
Another potential source of apprehension is a lack of guidance as to 
how the FDIC will transfer covered bond liabilities to a buyer in case of 
issuer default.  This concern has been somewhat ameliorated, however, 
by the September 2008 bankruptcy filing of Washington Mutual, one of 
the two previous issuers of covered bonds in the U.S.120  When the FDIC 
was named receiver of Washington Mutual, following the closure it 
transferred to JPMorgan Chase & Co. all deposits, assets and certain 
liabilities of the failed institution.121  The FDIC kept Washington 
Mutual’s covered bonds separate from its other liabilities and passed 
them in their entirety to JPMorgan Chase & Co., which assumed all ob-
ligations of the covered bonds.122  Nevertheless, Washington Mutual 
was very fortunate to find a buyer that assumed its covered bond obliga-
tions,123 and investors remain nervous about what would happen if the 
FDIC could not find such a purchaser.124 
 119. See id. at 7. 
 120. WASHINGTON MUT. INC. BANKR. NEWS (Bankr. Creditors’ Serv., Inc., Fairless 
Hills, P.A.), Sept. 29, 2008, available at http://bankrupt.com/wamunews.txt. 
 121. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Information for Claimants in 
Washington Mutual Bank (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news 
/press/2008/pr08085b.html. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Al Yoon, WaMu Covered Bonds Rally, Pass Key Investor Test, REUTERS, Sept. 
26, 2008, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idINN26307 
54720080926 (“Covered bonds issued by Washington Mutual Inc[.] jumped . . . after 
U.S. regulators affirmed the supporting assets would be assumed by JPMorgan Chase & 
Co, easing investor doubts of how the securities may be treated in a bank insolvency.”). 
 124. The concern is that if banks are not able to pay their covered bonds obligations, 
the taxpayer is ultimately liable for covered bond obligations if the FDIC decides to 
save a large covered bond issuer.  Peter Coy, Are Covered Bonds a Safe Way to Finance 
Mortgages? Not Likely, BUS. WEEK, July 30, 2008, at 25 available at http://www. 
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III.  1940 ACT EXEMPTIONS FOR PUBLIC ISSUERS OF COVERED BONDS 
It has been a long-standing principle of securities laws that regula-
tion is necessary to counteract the latent industry abuses that arise when 
persons or companies manage assets other than their own.125  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgated the 1940 
Act as part of a broad effort to enact federal securities legislation during 
the 1930s to curb gaming of the financial system and mandate disclosure 
to investors.126 
The broad reach of the 1940 Act does not overlook issuance struc-
tures built around SPEs.  Under the 1940 Act, most securitizations are 
viewed as “investment companies”127 and thus must comply with its im-
posed regulatory scheme.  Investment companies are subject to intense 
federal oversight and compliance with the 1940 Act is typically very 
expensive and onerous.128  In fact, its provisions are so burdensome for 
businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_32/b4095000911375.htm (“[C]overed bonds 
wouldn’t reduce risk as much as transfer it from bond buyers to the U.S. taxpayer.”).  
The FDIC could potentially extinguish its own internal insurance fund not for the ad-
vantage of bank depositors, its intended beneficiaries, but for the benefit of covered 
bond investors.  See id.; Johnson, supra note 80; Coy, supra note 125.  It is also pos-
sible, however, that because of overcollateralization or some other variable the value of 
the pledge collateral for covered bonds is greater than the total amount of all valid 
claims held by the covered bond holders.  TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra 
note 16, at 16.  In that case, the excess amount belongs to the FDIC and serves as an 
addition to its insurance fund. 
 125. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
561 (1981). 
 126. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND 
CAPITAL MARKETS 129 (2004). 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2004) (“Investment company” is defined in pertinent 
part as an issuer of securities that either “is or holds itself out as being engaged primari-
ly, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading 
in securities; is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount 
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any 
such certificate outstanding; or is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of 
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to 
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 percentum of the value of 
such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an 
unconsolidated basis.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (broadly defining “security” 
to include notes, stocks, bonds, evidences of indebtedness, investment contracts, and 
“any interest of instrument commonly known as a ‘security’”). 
 128. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (prohibitions or restrictions on issuing debt 
securities); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, 80a-16 (restrictions and limits on the composition of 
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SPEs that securitization structures strive to find exemptions from 
investment company status so as to rid themselves of the compelled 
oversight.  In theory, because SPE-issuance covered bond financing 
structures resemble securitization, issuers of covered bonds would not be 
excused from complying with the 1940 Act and its accompanying bur-
dens without specific exemptions. 
Attorneys in securitizations rely primarily on one proviso in the 
1940 Act to exempt public offerings of structured financings from its 
burdens:  Rule 3a-7.129  Hypothetically, attorneys involved in covered 
bond issuances could also attempt to use this exemption to escape the 
1940 Act.  The inherent structure of covered bonds, however, could 
potentially disqualify issuers of this asset class from using this exemp-
tion.  Therefore, covered bond issuers would be left with little choice but 
to use a different exemption, most likely Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the 1940 
Act,130 which is not tailored specifically for structured financings, or to 
attempt an expansion of the applicability of Rule 3a-7 to include covered 
bonds.131  While using Section 3(c)(5)(C) might be acceptable for now, 
since covered bonds in the U.S. are restricted to residential mortgages, 
expansion of Rule 3a-7 is more favorable to the future development of 
covered bonds should it expand to other asset classes because it elimi-
nates exemptions based on asset classifications.132 
A.  Rule 3a-7 
In November of 1992, the SEC issued Rule 3a-7 with the primary 
purpose of exempting nearly all SPEs involved in securitizations from 
 
the board of directors); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13, 80a-15(a) (requirements of shareholder 
votes for certain issues); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (continuing reporting and disclosure 
requirements). 
 129. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1992). 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5). 
 131. Besides Section 3(c)(5) and Rule 3a-7 exemptions, the 1940 Act contains other 
exemptions from “investment company” status for issuers in public offerings.  They are 
not as favorable, however, for securitization structures.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b), 
-3(c)(3), -3(c)(4), -3(c)(6).  Other exemptions from “investment company” status apply 
to private, not public, offerings.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), -3(c)(7).  If no 
statutory exemption is available, an SPE can petition the SEC under Sections 3(b)(2) 
and 6 of the 1940 Act to issue an order exempting the SPE from registering as an 
“investment company,” although there is no guarantee that the SEC will grant one.  See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(b)(2), -6(c) (1996). 
 132. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(A)-(C). 
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the definition of “investment company” as long as they meet certain cri-
teria.133  This rule exempts most structured financings currently used in 
the capital markets for all sectors of the economy, not just the mortgage 
segment. 
Rule 3a-7 provides that an SPE that purchases or otherwise holds 
receivables will not fall within the definition of “investment company” if 
it complies with the following four conditions: 
 
(1) the SPE issues securities whose payment depends primarily 
on the cash flow from “eligible assets;” 
(2) the securities issued must be high-rated (investment-grade or 
better) by at least one nationally-recognized rating agency 
(in addition to other regulation exemptions for private of-
ferings); 
(3) the SPE does not buy or sell the receivables unless it is with-
in the terms of the agreements pursuant to which the SPE’s 
securities are issued, and not “for the primary purpose of 
recognizing gains or decreasing losses resulting from market 
value changes;” and 
(4) unless the SPE issues securities that are not exempt from 
registration with the SEC under Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 
Act, the SPE must appoint an independent trustee for those 
securities.134 
 
Currently, for purposes of Rule 3a-7, the SEC defines “eligible 
assets” as “financial assets, either fixed or revolving, which by their 
terms convert into cash within a finite time period plus any rights or 
other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of 
proceeds to security holders.”135  By their nature, covered bonds fall 
within this definition:  upon maturity covered bond investors are reim-
bursed their investment in cash and may keep all interim interest pay-
ments.  The SEC acknowledged that the scope of the definition of 
“eligible assets” may not encompass all types of assets that can be 
securitized as of the rule’s release date and that the definition may be 
expanded.136 
 133. Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured 
Financings, 1940 Act Release No. 19,105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 85,062, 57 Fed. Reg. 56248 (Nov. 27, 1992) [hereinafter Rule 3a-7 Release]. 
 134. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7. 
 135. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(b)(1). 
 136. Rule 3a-7 Release, supra note 134. 
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Satisfaction of the first condition, however, is still potentially prob-
lematic for issuers of covered bonds.  Payments to covered bond invest-
tors do not come out of the underlying assets but arise out of the issuer’s 
general cash flows.137  Ultimately, covered bond payments have little to 
do with the cash flows from the actual cover pool.  The cover assets are 
held on the issuer’s balance sheet as collateral to provide recourse in 
case of default, not for the purpose of relaying their cash streams to cov-
ered bond holders.138  Since covered bond structures cannot comply with 
the first requirement of Rule 3a-7, this nonconformity effectively dis-
qualifies Rule 3a-7 as an exemption from the 1940 Act for covered bond 
issuers. 
Neither the text of Rule 3a-7 nor the comments to its release pro-
vide guidance as to what percentage of required payments must be cov-
ered by cash flows from these eligible assets to satisfy the “primarily” 
requirement.  Shifting focus to another aspect of a possible exclusion 
from “investment company” status leads to an examination of the SEC’s 
intent in forming the relationship between payments and cash flows 
from eligible assets.  The SEC’s Investment Company Act Rule 3a-7 
release (“Rule 3a-7 Release”) states that “[t]he provision tying payments 
to cash flows is intended to include payments obtained in any manner 
other than from the market value or fair value of the eligible assets.”139  
The Rule 3a-7 Release thus indicates that payments from cash collateral 
accounts and proceeds from credit enhancements constitute “cash flow 
from eligible assets.”140  A covered bond originator retains cover assets 
on its balance sheet and the issuing SPE pays investors out of the origin-
nator’s general cash flows for the purpose, in part, of providing a credit 
enhancement to its covered bonds.  Thus, it may be logical to conclude 
that these general cash flow payments to investors also constitute “cash 
flow from eligible assets.”  Furthermore, since the payments on covered 
bond obligations come from the issuer’s general cash flows, covered 
bond payments do not depend on the market value or fair value of the 
underlying assets. 
A conceivably advantageous approach to adapting Rule 3a-7 for 
exempting covered bond issuances would be to clarify this indication to 
specifically mention covered bonds and qualify that payments in relation 
 137. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7.  In a securitization, the 
investors receive payments from the cash flows of the underlying assets. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Rule 3a-7 Release, supra note 134, at n.17. 
 140. Id. at Part II.A.2(i). 
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to covered bonds satisfy the “primarily” requirement despite not being 
dependent on the underlying receivables.  Such a method would provide 
certainty to the developing covered bond market and relieve the con-
cerns of would-be covered bond issuers that are wary of the burdens im-
posed by the 1940 Act. 
B.  Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
Section 3(c)(5) of the 1940 Act has long been a fundamental ex-
emption provision applicable to certain securitization transactions.  Prior 
to the adoption of Rule 3a-7, Section 3(c)(5) was the primary avenue for 
exempting issuers of structured financings from “investment company” 
status.  Even after Rule 3a-7’s implementation, however, Section 3(c)(5) 
remains available as an exemption from registration under the 1940 Act 
for issuers of certain recognized types of assets.  Among Section 3(c)(5) 
exemptions, Section 3(c)(5)(C) is the most relevant for covered bonds, 
as the Treasury recommended that the development of the market should 
be confined to residential mortgages.141  Section 3(c)(5)(C) excludes 
from the definition of “investment company” entities not issuing 
“redeemable securities”142 and that are “primarily engaged”143 in “pur-
 
 141. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 6. 
 142. A “redeemable security” is “any security, other than short-term paper, under 
the terms of which the holder, upon its presentation to the issuer or to a person design-
nated by the issuer, is entitled (whether absolutely or only out of surplus) to receive 
approximately his proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or the cash 
equivalent thereof.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2006).  The SEC has previously stated 
that securities would not be considered “redeemable” where significant restrictions are 
placed on the terms of their redemption.  See Redwood Mortgage Investors VII, SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 285819 (Jan. 5, 1990) (minimum one-year holding period, 
limitations on the source of funds for liquidation payments, and limitations on the 
aggregate amount of liquidation payments in any twelve-month period if an investor 
wanted to redeem). 
 143. The SEC generally interprets “primarily engaged” to mean that at least 55% of 
the issuer’s assets must consist of real estate fee interests and/or loans secured exclu-
sively by real estate.  See NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176787 
(June 20, 1991).  Additionally, at least 25% of issuer’s assets must be invested in real 
estate-type interests (subject to reduction to the extent that the issuer invests more than 
55% of its total assets into real estate fee interests and/or loans secured exclusively by 
real estate), and the remainder, no more than 20% of the issuer’s assets may consist of 
miscellaneous investments, such as cash, cash equivalents, and any other non-real estate 
related asset.  See Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 
WL 177011 (Aug. 8, 1991). 
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chasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and in-
terests in real estate.”144 
Similar to a securitized mortgage issuance, a covered bond issuance 
would satisfy Section 3(c)(5)(C) requirements.  In a typical securiti-
zation transaction, the issuer cannot redeem the interests in receivables 
sold to investors.  Nor could it do so in a covered bond transaction.  In 
addition, an SPE is typically created to handle one particular securiti-
zation, such as of mortgage receivables, and so satisfies the “primarily 
engaged” requirement.  Feasibly, an SPE in a covered bond issuance 
would be subject to the same limitation and would satisfy the “primarily 
engaged” provision. 
CONCLUSION 
The releases of the Best Practices Guide and the Policy Statement 
are appropriate initial steps in forming a U.S. covered bond market.  
Both take cues from the UCITS Directive guidelines as to maintaining a 
dynamic cover pool, clear identification of cover assets on the issuer’s 
balance sheet, recourse to the cover pool and the issuer in case of de-
fault, and mandatory asset monitoring and disclosure provisions.  They 
avoid certain aspects of already-developed covered bond frameworks – 
the €1 billion requirement of the Benchmark Covered Bond Model and 
the CRD risk weighting benefits – for the sake of growing a covered 
bond market in the U.S. 
Covered bonds can certainly be created with other high-quality 
cash-flow producing types of collateral, such as credit card receivables 
or municipal debt, but “when you start a market you always try to start 
small.”145  Moreover, the Treasury and the FDIC did not address the 
actual mechanics of a covered bond transaction, such as bond pricing 
and yield.146  Instead, they would prefer market participants to decide 
such factors through dynamic aspects of supply and demand, although 
 144. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C). 
 145. ASR REPORT, supra note 97, at 18 (statement of Roundtable participant Prue 
Larocca, Managing Dir., RBS Greenwich Capital); see Heidi Crebo-Rediker & Douglas 
Rediker, Commentary, Covered Bonds Can Rebuild America, FORBES, July 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/28/covered-bonds-infrastructure-oped-cx_ 
hcr_dr_0728bonds.html. 
 146. See Johnson, supra note 80. 
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they recommended using swap agreements to mitigate market uncer-
tainties such as currency and interest rate risks.147 
The potential lack of the Rule 3a-7 exemption from the 1940 Act 
does not indicate that covered bond issuances will be subject to the 1940 
Act.  Covered bond issuers in public offerings will still benefit from the 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) exemption because they are likely to satisfy its con-
ditions.  Looking forward, if the covered bond market expands beyond 
residential mortgages, Section 3(c)(5) is confined by artificial asset class 
distinctions in treatment under the 1940 Act.148  Rule 3a-7 standardizes 
the exemption by shifting the focus from whether a specific type of asset 
falls within the exclusion to whether the issuance form is that of struc-
tured financing.  Therefore, Rule 3a-7 proves more beneficial should the 
covered bond market grow, mature and expand to assets beyond the 
applicability of Section 3(c)(5) and should be qualified specifically to 
include covered bond issuances. 
As a result of the government’s commitment to developing the cov-
ered bond market, banks in the U.S. will be amenable to issuing covered 
bonds, since they provide significant benefits in the form of high credit 
ratings and lower cost of funding as compared to senior, unsecured 
corporate debt of the issuer.149  Given time and effort, the covered bond 
market will grow as investors’ appetite for risk abates and they seek 
cover in safer issuances that provide recourse to the originator. 
 
 147. Because the presence of recourse guarantees less risk, covered bonds should 
yield less than securitized assets and so their spreads should be lower. 
 148. Section 3(c)(5)(A) excludes entities that are “primarily engaged” in acquiring 
common types of receivables used in securitizations, such as student loans, credit card 
receivables and auto loan receivables.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(A).  Section 3(c)(5)(B) 
refers to loans to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and to prospective purchasers of 
specified merchandise, insurance and service.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(B). 
 149. See Bond Basics, supra note 21 (in many European cases, covered bonds carry 
ratings even higher than those of the issuers); see also Packer et al., supra note 40, at 
51. 
